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PROXIMATE CAUSE IN NORTH CAROLINA TORT LAW
ROBERT G. BYRD*
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSATION
Causation is a legal doctrine used by courts to impose appropriate
limitatons upon tort liability. The requirement of a cause-in-fact rela-
tionship between conduct and harm' limits a tortfeasor's liability not
only to consequences actually caused by such conduct 2 but also to those
that would not have occurred without it.3 The existence of a cause-in-
fact relationship, however, does not establish liability since under the
rules of proximate cause considerations of policy and fairness are taken
into account to limit a tortfeasor's liability short of all consequences his
conduct may have caused.4
The notion that some harm of the general type that has occurred
be foreseeable is the overriding principle adopted by most courts to limit
liability for negligence.5 Through this broad principle courts have at-
tempted to limit liability to those risks on account of which a tortfea-
sor's conduct is found to be negligent and thus to deny recovery for
harm caused by other risks whether they are associated with the tortfea-
sor's conduct or arise independently of it.' North Carolina follows the
foreseeability approach. 7 However, here, as elsewhere, a number of fac-
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
'For a discussion of actual causation see Byrd, Actual Causation in North Carolina Tort Law,
50 N.C.L. REv. 261 (1972).
'Clarke v. Holman, 274 N.C. 425, 163 S.E.2d 783 (1968) (failure to give traffic signal that
would not have been seen had it been given); Oxendine v. Lowry, 260 N.C. 709, 133 S.E.2d 687
(1963) (absence of light on bicycle played no part in causing accident); Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C.
747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959) (no showing that substance sprayed on pond caused death of fish).3Holland v. Malpass, 255 N.C. 395, 121 S.E.2d 576 (1961) (accident could not have been
avoided had defendant been driving at safe speed); Lane v. Eastern Carolina Drivers Ass'n, 253
N.C. 764, 117 S.E.2d 737 (1961) (protective barrier, had it been present, would have provided no
protection from speeding race car); Ham v. Greensboro Ice & Fuel Co., 204 N.C. 614, 169 S.E.
180 (1933) (truck backed negligently; child under truck, would have been struck had truck been
driven forward).
'Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967) (charge that permitted recovery
upon finding of negligence and actual causation held erroneous); Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268
N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (same).
5Ratliffv. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966).
'Belk v. Boyce, 263 N.C. 24, 138 S.E.2d 789 (1964) (cruelty-to-animal statute not intended
for ptoection of humans); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934) (although
thieves could be anticipated, injury to employee unforeseeable when stolen coal was thrown off
railway car); Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N.C. 392, 49 S.E. 885 (1905) (plaintifi's failure to
watch where he was walking may not include risk that plank on which he stepped would "fly up"
and hit him).
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tors8 other than foreseeability have influenced the determination of the
extent of liability and have resulted in imposition of liability beyond,'
and short of,'0 foreseeable risks.
The language of causation is unfathomable. It is replete with
loaded words upon the choice of which the existence of liability seems
to depend. "Direct," "natural and probable," "real," "efficient," and
"dominant" are words employed when liability exists." The absence of
liability is disclosed by such words as "remote," "passive," and "condi-
tion."' 2 When third persons or other forces intervene between a tortfea-
sor's conduct and a claimant's injury, phrases such as "unbroken chain
of causation," "intervention of a distinct wrongful act," and "sole
cause" assume importancee 3 Critics have shown little resistance to the
'Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Pettus v. Sanders, 259 NC.
211, 130 S.E.2d 330 (1963).
8A narrower range of policy considerations than bear upon the question whether any liability
exists in the first instance have affected the determination of the extent of liability.
'Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968) (liability for aggravation of preexisting
condition); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964) (liability for unforeseca-
ble consequences of foreseeable impact upon person); Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E,2d 804
(1940) (liability beyond foreseeable risks for intentional tort).
10Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949) (shifting
responsibility; seller of defective hot water heater not liable for explosion when service man, aware
of presence of gas vapors, struck match which ignited them); Ferguson v. City of Asheville, 213
N.C. 569, 197 S.E. 146 (1938) (intervening negligence; driver's negligence in failing to discover
ramp negligently placed in street by city relieved city of liability to third party); Johnson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 184 N.C. 101, 113 S.E. 606 (1922) (no recovery for economic loss); Kimberly v.
Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) (no recovery for negligently inflicted mental harm
unless contemporaneous or resulting physical injury) (dictum).
"Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438, 445, 137 S.E.2d 827, 831 (1964) ("direct chain of events");
Rowe v. Murphy, 250 N.C. 627, 633, 109 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1959) ("real, efficient cause"); Clark
v. Lambreth, 235 N.C. 578, 585, 70 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1952) ("real, efficient cause"); Hodges v.
Virginia-Carolina Ry., 179 N.C. 566, 570, 103 S.E. 145, 146 (1920) ("direct result"); Hudson v.
Railroad, 142 N.C. 198, 206, 55 S.E. 103, 106 (1906) ("consequences which follow in unbroken
sequence . . . are natural and proximate").
"
2Stockwell v. Brown, 254 N.C. 662, 667, 119 S.E.2d 795, 798 (1961) ("condition"); White v.
Cason, 251 N.C. 646, 649-50, 111 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1960) ("passive"); Montgomery v. Blades, 218
N.C. 680, 684, 12 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1940) ("remote").
3Price v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 274 N.C. 32, 44, 161 S.E.2d 590, 599 (1968) ("negligence
...continued up to the very moment of impact"); Stutts v. Burcham, 271 N.C. 176, 180-81, 155
S.E.2d 742, 745-46 (1967) ("sole proximate cause"); Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 264, 100
S.E.2d 511, 513 (1957) ("the causal chain . . . is broken"); Alford v. Washington, 238 N.C. 694,
698, 78 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1953) C"independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act. ..
of an outside agency"); Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 668, 78 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1953) ("intervening
acts . . . acted as a nonconductor").
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obvious temptation to decry the ineptness of this language to deal with
problems of legal responsibility. However, much of this criticism may
attribute to the languge greater significance than courts ever intended
it to have. Although it is true that courts sometimes become entangled
by causation language, they appear to use it to describe a result or
conclusion concerning liability and not as a statement of basic principle
or as an analytical tool for solution of scope-of-liability problems. The
fact that neither principle nor analysis is disclosed probably reflects
simply that the decision represents a determination reached after all the
factors bearing upon the case have been considered.
Statements by the North Carolina Supreme Court that "proximate
cause" is a question of fact 14 and is usually for the jury to decide, 15 if
accepted at face value, are misleading. The question dealt with in terms
of proximate cause is whether a tortfeasor is to be held liable for harm
his negligence has in fact caused. That decision in the final analysis is
not one of fact but instead is an evaluative determination. Although
legal rules attempt to establish the boundaries of and guidance for this
determination, it remains one that is subject to all the influences that
bear upon human judgment.
Several factors limit the jury's role in deciding "proximate cause."
An elaborate, though imprecise, rule structure has evolved out of the
decided cases, and it may affect the determination whether the case is
to be submitted to the jury," and in the cases submitted, it is supposed
to impose directions that the jury must follow in making its decision.
North Carolina courts, trial and appellate, have shown little reluctance
to decide the "proximate cause" question as a matter of law, 7 and
"E.g., Conley v. Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N.C. 211, 214, 29 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1940):
"Proximate cause is an inference of fact, to be drawn from other facts and circumstances ....
It is only when the facts are all admitted and only one inference may be drawn from them that
the court will declare whether an act was the proximate cause of an injury or not. But that is rarely
the case."
"
5Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438, 137 S.E.2d 827 (1964); Davis v. Jessup, 257 N.C. 215, 125
S.E.2d 440 (1962); Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960); Woods v. Freeman,
213 N.C. 314, 195 S.E. 812 (1938).
"See, e.g., Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957) (nonsuit affirmed;
intervening criminal act unforeseeable); Davis v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 238 N.C. 106, 76
S.E.2d 378 (1953) (nonsuit affirmed; unforeseeable risk); Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949) (jury verdict overturned; liability shifted to third party
who acted with knowledge of risk); Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1939) (jury verdict
overturned; intervening culpable and gross negligence).
"See, e.g., McLaney v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 236 N.C. 714, 74 S.E.2d 36 (1952);
Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1952); Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d
1973]
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although the court's role is not as dominant as the jury's, it is nonethe-
less a significant one.
Proximate cause has become something of a work horse for negli-
gence law. It has been used to deny recovery in cases in which the law,
because of the relationship between the parties" or the circumstances
under which the accident occurred,'" imposed no duty upon the defen-
dant in relation to the injured person. Other cases .have relied upon the
proximate cause rationale when the evidence simply failed to disclose
any negligence of the defendant.2 1 In still others, proximate cause has
been extended to envelop contributory negligence2' and the closely re-
lated doctrine of last clear chanceY.2 The confusion that has at times
surrounded last clear chance2 may be an unfortunate consequence of
this envelopment. Perhaps the only significance of many of the above
decisions is that they create additional confusion about a concept that
is already burdened with great uncertainty.
The North Carolina Supreme Court often merges actual causation
and proximate cause into a single issue: proximate cause is a cause that
produced the result in continuous sequence and without which it would
not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence
could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts
as they existed.Y This practice may account for the occasional case in
which the trial judge's charge on proximate cause erroneously defines
it solely in terms of the "but for" standard of actual causation.25 It
295 (1948); Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446 (1935); Gant v. Gant, 197 N.C. 164, 148
S.E. 34 (1929).
"
5State ex rel. Garland v. Gatewood, 241 N.C. 606, 86 S.E,2d 195 (1955); Ellis v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 214 N.C. 388, 199 S.E. 403 (1938).
"Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d 295 (1948); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530,
174 S.E. 443 (1934); Roseman v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 112 N.C. 709, 16 S.E. 766 (1893).
0Leake v. Queen City Coach Co., 270 N.C. 669, 155 S.E.2d 161 (1967); White v. Cason, 251
N.C. 646, 111 S.E.2d 887 (1960); Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780
(1955); Cooley v. Baker, 231 N.C. 533, 58 S.E.2d 115 (1950).
"Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E.2d 412 (1941); Stephens v. Black-
wood Lumber Co., 191 N.C. 23, 131 S.E. 314 (1925).
2Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C. 500, 142 S.E.2d 361 (1965).
"Torts, Eleventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 721, 723-26
(1964); 33 N.C.L. REv. 138 (1954).
21E.g., Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 393, 154 S.E.2d 543, 547 (1967); Nance v. Parks,
266 N.C. 206, 209, 146 S.E.2d 24, 27 (1966).
2'Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967); Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268
N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966).
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probably also explains why cause-in-fact issues are sometimes dealt with
in terms of proximate cause.28
FORESEEABILITY
The characterization of conduct as negligence involves the determi-
nation that it entails foreseeable risks of injury that are unreasonable
under existing circumstances.27 The most significant limitation-of-
liability concept dealt with in terms of proximate cause is also foreseea-
bility.2 8 It limits a defendant's liability to those consequences that he can
reasonably foresee will be caused by his negligent conduct. The broad
thrust of the foreseeability rule is that the extent of liability as well as
the basis of liability is to be determined by fault. Liability for negligence
extends only to harm from unreasonable risks because of which the
conduct was found to be negligent. Harm from other risks, although
causally connected to the negligent conduct, is outside the scope of
liability.
The principle of foreseeability used to limit the extent of liability
is simply an extension of the concept of foreseeable risks required to
establish negligence. The determination of negligence can usually be
made without detailed inquiry into the nature and extent of specific risks
or, for that matter, of the aggregate risks created by an act or omission.
However, once the decision is made to limit liability to injury from
foreseeable risks, a more complete risk analysis is needed to determine
whether an injury was caused by risks defendant could reasonably have
foreseen would be created by his negligent conduct.
For the defendant to be liable, neither the precise injury, 9 the
particular consequences it produces, 0 nor the exact manner in which
2 Johnson v. Meyer's Co., 246 N.C. 310, 98 S.E.2d 315 (1957).
"Ennis v. Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 136 S.E.2d 702 (1964); Lea v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
246 N.C. 287, 98 S.E.2d 9 (1957).
"Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967) (foreseeability is a prerequisite of
proximate cause and failure of trial judge to instruct jury on it is reversible error); Ratliff v. Duke
Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (same); Pettus v. Sanders, 259 N.C. 211, 130
S.E.2d 330 (1963) (same); McNair v. Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956) (same).
2
'Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C. 448, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953) (charge that required precise injury to
be foreseen held reversible error); Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904) (same).
'Green v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 263 N.C. 503, 139 S.E.2d 538 (1965) (that the defen-
dant could foresee the likelihood of a collision is enough); Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
142 N.C. 198, 55 S.E. 103 (1906) (if the defendant can foresee some injury, it does not matter
that the injury is more serious or different from what he had reason to suspect).
19731
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it occurs3 must be foreseen. All that is required is that defendant, "in
the exercise of the reasonable care of an ordinarily prudent person,
should have foreseen that some injury would result from [his] negli-
gence, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature should have
been expected."3 Not all possible consequences that may arise from
an act are reasonably foreseeable. However, a result, to be foreseeable,
need not be more likely than not to occur.
Beyond these general ideas, little has been done to define foreseea-
bility and the results in the cases add little to its meaning. That an
invitee would slip on debris on the floor and fall into a circular saw,33
that an unknown person would back his car into an improperly secured
sign in a parking lot, 4 and that a telephone pole located within six
inches of the traveled portion of a street would endanger users of the
street3 have all been held to be beyond the realm of the foreseeable. It
is also unforeseeable that a board placed between the rear tire of a car
and icy pavement will, upon attempt to move the car, shoot backwards
and strike a bystander; 3 that a screw extending from a ladder beneath
the surface of the water in a swimming pool will injure a person swim-
ming in the pool; 3 or that the driver of a truck, after moving his truck
a few feet from a loading ramp, will be endangered by an open elevator
shaft near the ramp. 3 Since the above consequences seem in no way
remarkable, cases like these suggest that the range of foreseeability is
quite narrow.
This restrictive view of foreseeability, however, is not borne out by
other cases in which liability has been imposed for consequences that
under existing circumstances seemed much less likely to have been an-
ticipated. It has been held to be foreseeable that severance of a telephone
line would cause delay in summoning a physician to attend a woman in
childbirth;39 that a fair patron's foot would be caught in the trial rope
"Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438, 137 S.E.2d 827 (1964) (defendant turned left while plaintiff
was passing him; plaintiff, attempting to avoid collision, lost control of car, came back across
highway, and collided with tree); Bondurant v. Mastin, 252 N.C. 190, 113 S.E.2d 292 (1960).
"Hamilton v. McCash, 257 N.C. 611, 618-19, 127 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1962). See also Hart v.
Curry, 238 N.C. 448, 449, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
33Deaver v. Deaver, 236 N.C. 186, 72 S.E.2d 225 (1952).
31Johnson v. Meyer's Co., 246 N.C. 310, 98 S.E.2d 315 (1957).
15Wood v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 228 N.C. 605, 46 S.E.2d 717 (1948).
"Gant v. Gant, 197 N.C. 164, 148 S.E. 34 (1929).
"Hiatt v. Ritter, 223 N.C. 262, 25 S.E.2d 756 (1943).
'
5 Lee v. Carolina Upholstery Co., 227 N.C. 88, 40 S.E.2d 688 (1946).
"Hodges v. Virginia-Carolina Ry., 179 N.C. 566, 103 S.E. 145 (1920).
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of a balloon and that he would be carried by the balloon; 0 that a train,
after colliding with a car at a crossing, would carry the car seventy-five
feet down the tracks where the car would fall on a woman who was
working in her flower garden;41 and that a pregnant lady with poor
vision would faint and fall down an open elevator shaft. 2
Broad generalities to the effect that negligent,4 3 intentional," or
criminal conduct45 of others is not foreseeable or that a person has the
right to assume that others will obey the law, 46 although frequently
resorted to by the court, are likely to be misleading rather than helpful.
The idea included in these broadsides may be relevant in a particular
case to the determination whether a defendant has been negligent at all47
and, if so, whether his negligence has contributed to increase the risk
of injury to others.4" Reasonable care does not require that an individual
safeguard against every exigency that may occur. A motorist, whose
conduct is otherwise reasonable, does not have to anticipate a sudden,
head-on confrontation with an oncoming, speeding car.49 A power com-
pany may not be negligent in maintaining uninsulated power lines when
the risk of exposure to them is negligible, and no liability attaches when
'"Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913).
"Watson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 457, 11 S.E.2d 312 (1940).
"2McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator & Mach. Co., 230 N.C. 539, 53 S.E.2d 45 (1949).
3Moody v. Kersey, 270 N.C. 614, 155 S.E.2d 215 (1967) (stated but not applied); Salter v.
Lovick, 257 N.C. 619, 127 S.E.2d 273 (1962) (stated but not applied); Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C.
328, 75 S.E.2d I I (1953) (relied upon as one of grounds for decision).
"Herring v. Humphrey, 254 N.C. 741, 119 S.E.2d 913 (1961) (unforeseeable that 10-year-old
would run unlocked bulldozer into house); Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry., 187 N.C. 786, 123
S.E. 1 (1924) (unforeseeable that boy would push playment into speeding train); Fanning v. J.G.
White & Co., 148 N.C. 541, 62 S.E. 734 (1908) (unforeseeable that third party will fire rifle into
shanty in which dynamite negligently stored).
4"Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957) (car thief negligently injures
plaintiff; criminal act unforeseeable); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934)
(plaintiff struck by coal thrown off railway car by thieves; criminal act unforeseeable).
"Lucas v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1958) (right to assume motorist coming from
opposite direction will return his car to right lane of travel); Cox v. Hennis Freight Lines, 236 N.C.
72, 72 S.E.2d 25 (1952) (error to deny requested instruction that defendant had right to assume
others would obey law); Guthrie v. Gocking, 214 N.C. 513, 199 S.E. 707 (1938) (driver had right
to assume that oncoming car would return to right side of road).
'"E.g., Dolan v. Simpson, 269 N.C. 438, 152 S.E.2d 523 (1967) (another car, without warning,
turned suddenly across defendant's lane of travel); Baker v. Smith, 265 N.C. 598, 144 S.E.2d 658
(1965) (another car pulled from obscure private drive into street in front of defendant).
"Hout v. Harvell, 270 N.C. 274, 154 S.E.2d 41 (1967) (another car turned in his path so that
accident could not have been avoided if defendant had not been speeding); Butner v. Spease, 217
N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1940) (same).
"Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C. 185, 136 S.E.2d 668 (1964).
1973]
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injury occurs because contact is made with them in an unusual or unex-
pected way.'" Even when negligence is established, the question whether
it created or increased the risk that caused injury remains. Negligence
in driving a car at an excessive speed may be found not to have increased
the risk of a collision made inevitable when another car turned into its
path.-"
These cases do not support the general rule, sometimes applied by
the North Carolina Supreme Court,5" that misconduct of others is unfo-
reseeable. The intervention of wrongful conduct of others may be the
very risk that defendant's conduct creates53 or, even if it arises indepen-
dently of defendant's action, may be one against which he is under a
duty to safeguard.54 Beyond this, however, the defendant is required to
anticipate the exigencies of human conduct, including the occasional
negligence of others."5 "The mere fact that another is also negligent and
'Pugh v. Tidewater Power Co., 237 N.C. 693, 75 S.E.2d 766 (1953) (metal wire on which
kite flown came into contact with uninsulated power lines).
"Cases cited note 48 supra.
51Rowe v. Murphy, 250 N.C. 627, 109 S.E.2d 474 (1959) (unforeseeable that negligent driver
will collide with defendant's car negligently parked on highway); Alford v, Washington, 238 N.C.
694, 78 S.E.2d 915 (1953) (unforeseeable that negligent motorist will collide with pole and cause
uninsulated wires to fall); Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940)
(unforeseeable that negligently driven car will have accident because no warning of barricade in
street is given).
"Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956) (defendant's negligence stranded
plaintiff's car in highway); Gold v. Kiker, 216 N.C. 511, 5 S.E.2d 548 (1939) (failure to warn that
road was four feet wider than bridge into which it fed); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C.
536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921) (oncoming car collided with defendant's truck negligently parked on
highway); Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 176 N.C. 95, 97 S.E. 158 (1918) (drunken passenger,
ejected by defendant, walked into side of train); Woods v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv. Corp., 174
N.C. 697, 94 S.E. 459 (1917) (carrier negligently caused passenger to alight so as to be exposed to
passing traffic); Penny v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 133 N.C. 221, 45 S.E. 563 (1903) (railroad
failed to warn of danger created by shoot-out between passengers).
"Moody v. Kersey, 270 N.C. 614, 155 S.E.2d 215 (1967) (defendant on notice to use care when
assisted by a known inexperienced person); Penyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863 (1965)
(two-year-old, left alone in car, turned ignition switch); Benton v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv.
Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448 (1914) (twelve-year-old climbed tree in populous residential area
and came into contact with defendant's uninsulated electric wires); Stanley v. Southern Ry., 160
N.C. 323, 76 S.E. 221 (1912) (railroad provided insufficient personnel to control drunk and rowdy
passengers).
"Beanblossom v. Thomas, 266 N.C. 181, 146 S.E.2d 36 (1966) (defendant must anticipate
exigencies of traffic); Salter v. Lovick, 257 N.C. 619, 127 S.E.2d 273 (1962) (if defendant by
keeping proper lookout could have discovered unlighted car, he is liable); Hamilton v. McCash,
257 N.C. 611, 619, 127 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1962) (motorist tailgating truck struck child when truck
turned to avoid him; motorist "should have foreseen that some injury would result from her
negligence"); Davis v. Jessup, 257 N.C. 215, 220, 125 S.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1962) (oncoming car
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the negligence of the two results in injury to plaintiff does not relieve
either."5 And when an individual is aware of the negligence of others,
he may be required "to take all the more care to avoid" injury."
How far the foreseeability rule goes to limit liability for negligent
conduct is uncertain. If defendant's conduct creates unreasonable risks
of harm to one person, is he liable to another to whom no danger was
foreseeably threatened? When danger to property only is foreseeable,
will liability be imposed for unforeseeable personal injury? Is the defen-
dant, whose conduct creates risks of slight harm, to be held responsible
for disastrous consequences that in fact result? If the risk that causes
injury is one created by defendant's conduct, does liability attach when
the possibility that it would materialize is negligible? For the most part,
these questions have not received much attention from courts.
The decision in which the most extensive exploration of the prob-
lem has been made is Cardozo's opinion in the classic case of Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co.58 The defendant in assisting a passenger
to board a moving train, dislodged a package he was carrying. When
the package fell to the ground, the fireworks it contained exploded, and
the concussion overturned a pair of scales some distance away. The
scales fell upon and injured the plaintiff. Defendant's negligence in-
volved foreseeable risks of harm to the package and perhaps to the
passenger; but, as he had no knowledge of the contents of the package,
no risk of injury to the plaintiff could be foreseen. The majority of the
court in denying recovery, held that defendant's conduct was not negli-
gent toward the plaintiff.
turned left in front of speeding defendant; defendant "could have reasonably foreseen and expected
that the driver of one of the several cars approaching the same intersection . . . might turn left");
Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 493, 114 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1960) (oncoming car turned in front
of speeding defendant; "it cannot be said as a matter of law that the defendant . . . could not
reasonably have foreseen that some accident or injury was likely to occur as a result of his excessive
speed").
5 Green v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 263 N.C. 503, 506, 139 S.E.2d 538, 540-41 (1964);
accord, Earwood v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 27, 133 S.E. 180 (1926) (crossing accident; concurring
negligence of railroad and motorist); Turner v. Turner, 261 N.C. 472, 474-75, 135 S.E.2d 12, 14
(1964): "After all, two vehicles slammed into each other in the intersection in broad daylight,
injuring the passenger in one of them. One driver may have been more or less negligent than the
other, but the law does not measure negligence on a percentage basis in cases of this nature. ...
Each defendant is civilly responsible if some negligent act of his, combined with the negligent act
of the other, produces the harmful result."
57McNair v. Goodwin, 264 N.C. 146, 148, 141 S.E.2d 22,23 (1965); accord, Gregory v. Lynch,
271 N.C. 198, 155 S.E.2d 488 (1967) (speeder failed to slow down after seeing oncoming car begin
left turn in front of him); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952) (same).
-248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Cardozo, held that the
defendant's duty was limited by the risks to be perceived from his con-
duct and suggested other restrictions upon defendant's liability that this
limitation of duty might entail. A distinction might "be drawn accord-
ing to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct
negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in
property results in an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of another
order, as, e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may
be necessary." 59
The Palsgraf case has probably been more popular than influential
in judicial circles." Its practical impact has been in cases involving
"unforeseeable" plaintiffs, and in this situation its reception by courts
has been divided." The North Carolina Supreme Court apparently has
not utilized the "duty" rationale of Palsgraf. "Unforeseeable" plaintiff
cases have been decided under proximate cause, and the results have
been mixed. Recovery has been denied when a person, hit by defendant's
car, was propelled twenty-five feet through the air and struck the plain-
tiff;62 when a sapling, pushed with other debris by defendant's bulldozer,
flew out and struck plaintiff who was standing some distance away;"3
and even when a truck driver, after moving his truck a few feet away
from a loading platform, slipped and fell backwards into an open eleva-
tor shaft at the platform.64 Liability has been imposed when a train, after
colliding with a car at a crossing, carried the car seventy-four feet down
the tracks where the car fell on a woman who was working in her flower
garden;5 it has been imposed when a negligently shunted railway car left
the spur track, knocked down an electric line pole, and caused electric
current to be transmitted over the lines into a laundry some distance
away;66 and it has been imposed when a fire spread from a railroad right
"Id. at 347, 162 N.E. at 101.
"See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, 254-60 (4th ed. 1971).
"Id.
"Boone v. North Carolina R.R., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d 380 (1954); see Hudson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 142 N.C. 198, 55 S.E. 103 (1906) (railroad car got loose through defendant's
negligence, rolled some distance, and crashed into other cars, which in turn struck plaintiff who
was crossing tracks).
"Griffin v. Blankenship, 248 N.C. 81, 102 S.E.2d 451 (1958).
"Lee v. Carolina Upholstery Co., 227 N.C. 88, 40 S.E.2d 688 (1946).
"Watson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C. 457, 11 S.E.2d 312 (1940).
"Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C. 788, 143 S.E. 861 (1928).
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of way through an uncultivated field to the plaintiff's house where it
kindled a hen's nest, which set fire to the house. 7
The observation in Palsgraf that it might be appropriate to impose
liability for harm only to those interests and in the magnitude defen-
dant's conduct foreseeably threatened has not received significant sup-
port from the courts. 8 A number of decisions-mostly older ones-are
contrary to it." The sequel70 to the famous Wagon Mound case, 71 which
established the foreseeability rule in English negligence law, probably
reflects a reluctance to accept the idea that other courts may share.
Defendant, who negligently allowed furnace oil to overflow into the
harbor where it spread over the surface of the water, was held liable for
damage to ships in the harbor when the oil ignited. Although the fore-
seeable risk that the oil would ignite was only very light, the court found
no justification for defendant to ignore even that slight risk and imposed
liability. Further, the idea may have more theoretical appeal than pract-
ical significance as fact situations to which it would apply seem to have
occurred only infrequently. No North Carolina case in which the facts
raised this problem could be found.72
Some exceptions to the foreseeability rule are well established.
Defendant is held liable for consequences, whether or not they are fore-
seeable, when his negligent conduct causes a foreseeable impact upon
the person of another.73 The tortfeasor is said to take his victim as he
finds him and is liable for unforeseeable injuries that result because of
a preexisting physical74 or mental75 condition. He is liable for unusual
"Gainey v. Rockingham R.R., 235 N.C. 114, 68 S.E.2d 780 (1952).
"W. PRossER, supra note 60, § 43, at 259-60.
"See cases cited notes 74-75 infra; W. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 43, at 259.
"Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (1967) (P.C.
1966) (N.S.W.).
71Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C. 1961)
(N.S.W.).
Irrhe North Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the view that it is sufficient that defendant
could foresee some injury or consequences of a generally injurious nature. See cases cited notes
29-32 supra. It has also stated that when defendant could have foreseen some injury, he is not
relieved of liability if the injury that results is more serious than or different from the injury he
could foresee. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 N.C. 198, 55 S.E. 103 (1906).
73Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C.
663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
"Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
75Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964). See also Williamson v.
Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
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consequences," including death," that result from the injuries his negli-
gence causes. Extended liability has been imposed for unforeseeable
emotional harm as well as unforeseeable physical harm.7"
Liability is imposed only for aggravation of the preexisting condi-
tion since defendant's negligence is not a cause of the condition that
already existed .7 However, if defendant's negligence operates to precipi-
tate a dormant preexisting condition, he is liable for all the harm that
results.80 The distinction between a preexisting disease or impairment
that is already in active operation and one that is latent is largely a
practical one. In case of the former, discrimination between the existing
injury and the additional injury defendant's negligence has caused is
possible. In case of the latent condition, the chance that plaintiff's pecu-
liar susceptibility to harm would someday have precipitated injury any-
way-a fact that arguably should make defendant liable only for accel-
eration of the occurrence of the harm-is difficult of proof and inevita-
bly involves some speculation.8 '
Liability beyond foreseeable risks of conduct is generally stated to
exist for intentional torts.8" The imposition of extended liability is prob-
ably in part a carry-over from earlier law and in part a willingness to
impose greater responsibility when conduct is intended. Although defen-
dant's liability may still be cut off short of all the consequences his
conduct has caused, foreseeability plays a less important part in this
determination.
7
"Apel v. Queen City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966).
"Meekins v. Railway Co., 134 N.C. 217, 46 S.E. 493 (1904); Gray v. Little, 126 N.C. 385,
35 S.E. 611 (1900).
7
spotts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968); Meekins v. Railway Co., 134 N.C.
217, 46 S.E. 493 (1904).
"Potts v. Howser, 274 N.C. 49, 54, 161 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1968) (dictum).
8OApel v. Queen City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966); Lockwood v. McCaskill,
262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
"The suggestion has been made that the possibility that the injured person's predisposition
would have eventually precipitated injury should be taken into account in determining the amount
of the defendant's liability. Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L.
REV. 906, 926 (1965).
81Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940) (trespasser liable for harm although it
occurred without his fault and could not be anticipated by him); Clark v. Whitehurst, 171 N.C. 1,
86 S.E. 78 (1915) (defendant who wrongfully took possession of mule liable for its value although
he was not at fault in causing mule's death); Bear v. Harris, 118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896)
(defendant who moved schooner without permission liable for its value when it was destroyed by
storm); Bridgers v. Dill, 97 N.C. 222, 1 S.E. 767 (1887) (defendant who tore down fence liable for
damage to crops by livestock); Martin v. Cuthbertson, 64 N.C. 328 (1870) (defendant who rode
horse for greater distance and longer time than authorized liable for its death without his fault),
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Some83 North Carolina decisions indicate that the breach of a
statutory duty constitutes a separate tort84 and suggest that a defendant,
who has violated a safety statute, should be liable for consequences
beyond those for which compensation can be recovered in a negligence
action.8 However, the concept of more extensive liability for breach of
statutory duty never gained a significant foothold and now seems to
have been abandoned altogether.88 The court's later response to the idea
of extended liability is indicated in Aldridge v. Hasty:8 7
Strictly speaking, a violation of a criminal statute constitutes a
positive, affirmative tort which perhaps should never have been put in
the category of negligence. It would seem that this view prevails in
some jurisdictions where it is held that foreseeability is not a condition
of liability. In these jurisdictions the rule that the tort-feasor is liable
for any consequence that may flow from his unlawful act as the natural
and probable (or proximate) result thereof, whether he could foresee
or anticipate it or not, prevails. It is presumed that he intended what-
ever resulted from his unlawful act ...
In the past this rule has received the sanction of this Court by
direct decision as well as by way of obiter dicta ...
But the trend of our decisions since the advent of the automobile
has been to treat the breach of a criminal law as an act of negligence
per se unless otherwise provided in the statute ...
When the action is for damages resulting from the violation of a
"This paragraph is taken from another article by the writer: Byrd, Proof of Negligence in
North Carolina-Part IL Similar Occurrences and Violation of Statute, 48 N.C.L. REV. 731, 744-
45 (1970).
"E.g., Stone v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 546, 553-54, 105 S.E. 425, 429 (1920): "While it may
not be strictly accurate to speak of the breach of a duty arising out of a violation of a statutory
duty as negligence . . . it is generally so treated. . . . For practical purposes, it may properly be
a convenient mode of administering the right, because it involves the question of proximate cause
and contributory negligence. . . . [W]hen there is a violation of a statute or ordinance, especially
one. . which so deeply concerns public and individual safety, both as to person and property, it
is an illegal act, which, of itself, is a tort, without reference to the question of negligence .. "
"Holderfield v. Rummage Bros. Trucking Co., 232 N.C. 623, 61 S.E.2d 904 (1950); Dickey
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 N.C. 726, 147 S.E. 15 (1929); Hodges v. Virginia-Carolina Ry.,
179 N.C. 566, 103 S.E. 145 (1920); Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904).
"Ratliff v. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605, 151 S.E.2d 641 (1966) (charge that permitted
recovery upon finding that statutory violation was actual cause of injury held erroneous); McNair
v. Richardson, 244 N.C. 65, 92 S.E.2d 459 (1956) (charge that foreseeability was unnecessary if
defendant's act was unlawful held erroneous); Woods v. Freeman, 213 N.C. 314, 195 S.E. 812
(1938) (omission of proximate cause in charge held erroneous).
87240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
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[statute], does the doctrine of foreseeability apply? We are constrained
to answer in the affirmative.8
Assessment of the value of the foreseeability rule is difficult. While
the decisions in a large number of scope-of-liability cases are consistent
with it, this result may be more an incident of the fact that in the bulk
of cases the scope-of-liability issue presents no difficult problem than a
consequence produced by application of the foreseeability rule. What-
ever basic rule a court followed, the outcome in most of these cases
would likely be the same.
The crucial question then is how workable in the hard case is a rule
that attempts to limit liability to fault? Concepts such as foreseeability
and scope of risks through which this policy is implemented are at best
imprecise. To give them content in a particular fact situation without
resorting to the judgment whether defendant should be responsible for
the injury his conduct has caused is difficult. Yet this judgment is the
very one for which they are supposed to give guidance. Professor Morris
has properly pointed out that they are subject to manipulation by the
generality or detail in which a fact situation is described. 9 Recognition
of this possibility aids the attorney in presenting his argument and
permits the court to avoid obvious pitfalls but provides little help in
determining where between these extremes an appropriate description
of the facts lies. Again, it is difficult to prevent the judgment about
where legal responsibility should be placed from being a major factor
in this determination.
Despite the difficulty of its application, the risk rule is helpful
because it provides a general standard under which scope-of-liability
problems can be decided. However, its appeal is deceptive and can easily
cause the basic objective it seeks-allocation of loss between an injured
person and the tortfeasor-to be submerged in the pursuit of its logic.
When a tortfeasor's conduct has created danger which causes injury to
another through a series of bizarre happenings, it may be easy enough
to say that these happenings were unforeseeable. It is not so clear,
however, that this conclusion requires that the tortfeasor escape liability
and that the injured person be left to bear the loss. The foreseeability
rule can readily be overextended in this type of case. If a foreseeable
risk of injury is created by defendant's conduct but the circumstances
TId. at 358-59, 82 S.E.2d at 337-38.
"C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 176-77 (1953).
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leave doubt concerning whether defendant should be liable, an exces-
sively refined risk analysis amounts to little more than an arbitrary and
intellectually deceptive way of resolving that doubt. A better approach
may be to recognize that other factors should also be considered in these
instances. For example, in allocating the loss between the parties in such
a case, the existence of culpability on the part of one of them and the
extent of his culpability may legitimately be considered. Finally, the
broad philosophical premise at the foundation of the policy of limitation
of liability may itself be significant. Results may depend upon whether
the limitation is viewed as a protection of the tortfeasor to be strictly
enforced or a restriction upon the injured person's right of recovery to
be imposed only when good reason for its imposition exists.
INTERVENING CAUSES
In a large number of cases the determination of the extent of a
tortfeasor's liability is influenced by the time sequence in which two or
more events occurred. The typical situation is one in which a third
person or agency intervenes between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
injury and contributes to cause the injury. This situation and the legal
problem that arises out of it are usually described by the phrase "inter-
vening cause." A force or event that comes into existence after the
defendant has acted is an intervening cause;" one already in operation
at the time of the defendant's negligent act is not. 1 This distinction, easy
enough to state, is sometimes difficult to apply. The negligence of a
motorist who runs into an obstruction left in the street by defendant,
although it comes into operation after the obstruction is created, should
not be considered an intervening cause if the defendant has negligently
failed to warn of the existence of the obstruction.92 To project the events
which led to a collision between two moving vehicles so as to say that
the negligence of one driver was prior in time, while perhaps possible,
does not seem meaningful to the determination of legal liability. 3
"Illustrative fact situations may be found in Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 146 S.E.2d 24
(1966); Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964).
"Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 91
S.E.2d 894 (1956).
"Several North Carolina cases have held the negligence of the motorist to be an intervening
cause that insulated the negligence of the person who created the obstruction. E.g., Montgomery
v. Blades, 222 N.C. 463, 23 S.E.2d 844 (1942); Murray v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 218 N.C.
392, 11 S.E.2d 326 (1940); Beach v. Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446 (1935).
'"A number of North Carolina cases have held the negligence of the operator of one of the
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Although earlier decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court
indicated that intervening acts had to be gross and palpable to relieve a
defendant of liability, 4 it now seems well-settled that foreseeability is
the principle applied by the court to determine the extent of defendant's
liability in these cases as well as in cases in which no intervening cause
is involved. 5 Defendant must take into account matters within the realm
of common knowledge and is to be held liable when the intervening
cause is a part of the risk he has created. When a car skids on slippery
pavement,97 loose gravel on the highway is kicked up by passing cars,9"
a rotten porch rail collapses from the weight of a person leaning on it,"9
defendant's conduct is unreasonable because of the possibility that the
very thing that happened would occur. If the defendant's conduct helps
to precipitate the intervening event, it is reasonably regarded as a part
of the risk of his conduct for which he should be held liable."'0 The risk
of an obstruction or ditch in the street is that another driver will run
his car into it."°' That a drunken passenger, ejected from a train, will
walk into the side of it' and that a passenger caused by a carrier to
alight into traffic will be struck by a passing car °3 are the very conse-
quences risked by the defendant's unreasonable conduct.
vehicles to be an intervening cause. E.g., Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co., 250 N.C. 435, 108
S.E.2d 900 (1959) (intersectional collision of two cars); Troxier v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 240
N.C. 420, 82 S.E.2d 342 (1954) (inttersectional collision); Jones v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 235
N.C. 640, 70 S.E.2d 669 (1952) (railroad crossing collision).
'"Riggs v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E.2d 197 (1950); Williams v. Charles
Stores Co., 209 N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936). Cases that rejected this view also existed. Rattley
v. Powell, 223 N.C. 134, 25 S.E.2d 448 (1943) (error to instruct that intervening negligence, to
insulate, must be palpable and gross); Quinn v. Atlantic & Y. Ry., 213 N.C. 48, 195 S.E. 85 (1937)
(same).
"5E.g., Davis v. Jessup, 257 N.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 440 (1962); Watters v. Parrish, 252 NC.
787, 115 S.E.2d 1 (1960); Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
"Cole v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 211 N.C. 591, 191 S.E. 353 (1937) (redcap directed
passenger to train after starting signal given; passenger injured when train started as he attempted
to board).
'Karpf v. Adams, 237 N.C. 106, 74 S.E,2d 325 (1952).
"Stewart v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 202 N.C. 288, 162 S.E. 547 (1932).
"Young v. Barrier, 268 N.C. 406, 150 S.E.2d 734 (1966).
"'Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 146 S.E.2d 24 (1965) (driver left motor of car running;
mechanic, unaware motor was running, accidentally depressed accelerator while working in floor-
board); Harvell v. City of Wilmington, 214 N.C. 608, 200 S.E. 367 (1938) (drunk driver runs
through deceptive dead-end street).
"'Green v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 263 N.C. 503, 139 S.E.2d 538 (1964); Price v. City of
Monroe, 234 N.C. 666, 68 S.E.2d 283 (1951); Sample v. Spencer, 222 N.C. 580, 24 S.E,2d 241
(1943).
"'Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 176 N.C. 95, 97 S.E. 158 (1918).
"'Wood v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv. Corp., 174 N.C. 697, 94 S.E. 459 (1917).
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Equally good reasons exist to hold the defendant liable when at the
time he acts he is on notice of circumstances that make the intervention
of others likely.' 4 Under this view defendant was held liable for an
explosion caused when a lighted cigar came into contact with gasoline
vapors vented by him into an area where he knew others customarily
smoked.0 5 Similarly, a railroad that knew that mail bags were regularly
thrown from passing trains by employees of the government was held
liable to a passenger on the waiting platform who was struck by one of
them. ' And responsibility for assault upon a passenger was placed
upon a carrier that had failed to control a drunk and rowdy group of
passengers or had reason to anticipate an assault by some passengers
upon others.107
A reasonable person is also required to anticipate the intermeddling
of children,0 8 the customary reactions of animals," 9 weather conditions
that are not abnormal or unusual," the exigencies of traffic,"' and the
occasional negligence of others.12 The curious and immature interven-
tions of children can be foreseen and, when they occur, are not to be
considered superseding causes."' For this reason liability has been im-
'Moody v. Kersey, 270 N.C. 614, 155 S.E.2d 215 (1967) (defendant on notice to use care
when assisted by person known to be inexperienced); Murchison v. Powell, 269 N.C. 656, 153
S.E.2d 352 (1967) (defendant on notice that horse will be frightened by sound of passing car).
1'5Rushing v. Texas Co., 199 N.C. 173, 154 S.E. 1 (1930).
"'Thomas v. Southern Ry., 173 N.C. 494, 92 S.E. 321 (1917).
"'Stanley v. Southern Ry., 160 N.C. 323, 76 S.E. 221 (1912); Penny v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 133 N.C. 221, 45 S.E. 563 (1903); Britton v. Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry., 88 N.C. 536 (1883).
'"Campbell v. Model Steam Laundry, 190 N.C. 649, 130 S.E. 638 (1925); Barnett v. Cliffside
Mills, 167 N.C. 576, 83 S.E. 826 (1914). A strict view of the foreseeability of intervening intentional
acts of children is sometimes taken by the court. Herring v. Humphrey, 254 N.C. 741, 119 S.E.2d
913 (1961) (unforeseeable that 10-year-old would run unlocked bulldozer into a house); Lineberry
v. North Carolina Ry., 187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E. 1 (1924) (unforeseeable that plaintiff would be
pushed into speeding train by playmate).
'OSutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970); Murchison v. Powell, 269 N.C. 656,
153 S.E.2d 352 (1967); Wells v. Johnson, 269 N.C. 622, 153 S.E.2d 2 (1967).
110 lan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d
735 (1968) (strong wind); Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925)
(occasional lightning).
"'Beanblossom v. Thomas, 266 N.C. 181, 146 S.E.2d 36 (1966); Hamilton v. McCash, 257
N.C. 611, 127 S.E.2d 214 (1962); Bryant v. Woodlief, 252 N.C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
"'Graham v. Winson Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 188, 125 S.E.2d 429 (1962) (that
customer may negligently knock defective bottle off display rack); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E.2d 380 (1960) (contractor's negligent installation of defective hot water
heater supplied by defendant); Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953) (carrier's failure to discover defective car negligently loaded by shipper).
"'Cases cited notes 108 supra & 114-16 infra.
1973]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
posed when a two-year-old child, left alone in a car, turned the ignition
switch and started the car to roll,' when a seven-year-old child removed
dynamite caps from the place where they were negligently stored and
exposed them to fire,"' and when a twelve-year-old boy climbed a tree
on a populous residential street and came into contact with uninsulated
electrical wires."' Weather conditions, unless highly unusual and ex-
traordinary, 17 must be anticipated and their intervention, whether de-
fendant's negligence is simply a failure to safeguard against them"' or
exists independently of their occurrence,"' will not relieve him of liabil-
ity. Only those highly unusual occurrences that are termed acts of God
are held to be unforeseeable,' and even when they intervene the defen-
dant is held liable if his negligence combines with them to cause harm.',
The observation that the occasional negligence of others is foresee-
able is frequently made.' Many cases, in accord with this view, hold a
wrongdoer liable when an intervening negligent act combines with his
own negligence to cause injury."' In a substantial number of cases,
however, defendant has not been held liable on the grounds that the
intervening misconduct was unforeseeable."' The decisions, viewed
from the standpoint of what can reasonably be foreseen, are irreconcila-
ble. When a carrier caused a passenger to alight into the street, it was
"'Pinyan v. Settle, 263 N.C. 578, 139 S.E.2d 863 (1965).
"
5Krachanake v. Acme Mfg. Co., 175 N.C. 435, 95 S.E. 851 (1918).
"'Benton v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv. Corp., 165 N.C. 354, 81 S.E. 448 (1914).
"
7Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d
735 (1968); Bennett v. Southern Ry., 245 N.C. 261, 96 S.E.2d 31 (1957); Averitt v. Murrell, 49
N.C. 323 (1857).
"'Lynch v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 N.C. 252, 167 S.E. 847 (1933); Ridge v. Norfolk
S.R.R., 167 N.C. 510, 83 S.E. 762 (1914).
WLawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925); Gibbon v. Lamm,
183 N.C. 421, 111 S.E. 618 (1922).
'rOlan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 525, 160 S.E.2d
735, 741 (1968) (only "events in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and
other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them" constitutes acts
of God).
122Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925); Pickens County
v. Jennings, 181 N.C. 393, 107 S.E. 312 (1921); Harris v. Norfolk S.R.R., 173 N.C. 110, 91 S.E.
710 (1917).
122E.g., Beanblossom v. Thomas, 266 N.C. 181, 146 S.E.2d 36 (1965); Davis v. Jessup, 257
N.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 440 (1962).
1'3Turner v. Turner, 261 N.C. 472, 135 S.E.2d 12 (1964); Stockwell v. Brown, 254 N.C. 662,
119 S.E.2d 795 (1961); Earwood v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 27, 133 S.E. 180 (1926).
",E.g., Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d 111 (1953); Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C.




held to be foreseeable that he would be struck by a passing car;" 5 but
when a pedestrian was forced to walk into the street because the side-
walk was blocked, it was held unforeseeable that he would be negligently
run down by a motorist.' The negligence of a motorist who runs his
car into an obstruction in the highway negligently created by the defen-
dant has been held in some cases to be foreseeable21  and in others to
be unforeseeable. 28
One difficulty encountered in the North Carolina cases is that the
court uses the foreseeability concept as a vehicle to decide a number of
separate issues. In a number of cases in which intervening negligent
conduct was held to be unforeseeable, it seems fairly clear that the basis
for the decision was that under the circumstances, even if the other's
negligence was foreseeable, defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff in
regard to it.' To anticipate that a drunken passenger, ejected from a
bus, may be struck by a negligently driven car as he stumbles about the
streets entails no great strain upon the concept of foresight. However,
the determination of how far the carrier's responsibility for him should
extend, if at all, beyond seeing that he has alighted from the bus in a
safe place may provide a reasonable basis to deny its liability.'
In still other cases the facts simply failed to establish any unreason-
able conduct of the defendant.' In relation to the issue of negligence,
the statement that a person, unless existing circumstances put him on
notice, does not have to foresee the negligence of others is sensible. A
motorist who is operating his car on the highway in a reasonable manner
does not have to anticipate that an oncoming car will suddenly pull into
InWood v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv. Corp., 174 N.C. 697, 94 S.E. 459 (1917).
' 'Newell v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374 (1936).
'"Green v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 263 N.C. 503, 139 S.E.2d 538 (1965); Price v. City of
Monroe, 234 N.C. 666, 68 S.E.2d 283 (1951).
"'See cases cited note 92 supra.
"'Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 137 S.E.2d 132 (1964) (unsportsmanlike conduct toward
umpire by baseball manager; umpire assaulted by fans); State ex rel. Garland v. Gatewood, 241
N.C. 606, 86 S.E.2d 195 (1955) (drunk, negligently permitted by sheriff to escape, killed on railroad
tracks); Ellis v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 214 N.C. 388, 199 S.E. 403 (1938) (customer killed when
inflammable oil ignited somehow when he slammed door; probably outside area open to public);
Ballinger v. Rader, 151 N.C. 383, 66 S.E. 314 (1909) (girl killed by negligently discharged inmate
of insane asylum).
U*Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d 295 (1949); Roseman v. Carolina Cent. R.R.,
112 N.C. 709, 16 S.E. 766 (1893).
"'White v. Cason, 251 N.C. 646, 111 S.E.2d 887 (1960); Potter v. Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.,
242 N.C. 67, 86 S.E.2d 780 (1955); Clark v. Lambreth, 235 N.C. 578, 70 S.E.2d 828 (1952).
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his lane of travel,' that a car he is meeting will without warning turn
left across his path of travel,' or that another motorist will drive from
the roadside into the highway in front of him. 3 1
However, the issue whether conduct entails unreasonable risks at
all, which is the relevant one in the above cases, and the issue whether
a person is to be held liable for injury caused by unreasonable risks
created by his conduct involve substantially different considerations. In
the latter instance negligence, such as excessive speed or failure to keep
a proper lookout, exists without regard to the intervening conduct, and
a principal risk of the speed or improper lookout is that the negligently
operated vehicle will be involved in an accident. That there are negligent
drivers on the highways and that their presence increases the danger of
defendant's own negligent driving seem to be obvious factors that he
should be required to take into account. In this context, the conclusion
that defendant could foresee the specific negligent act of a particular
person is not essential either to establish his negligence or to identify
the collision as a risk of his conduct. On the other hand, the conclusion
that defendant could not foresee specific negligence of another person
seems equally unimportant in the determination of his liability.
In yet another group of cases in which intervening misconduct has
been held to be unforeseeable, defendant's conduct has not increased the
risk of injury to the plaintiff.35 The accident in which injury was sus-
tained would have occurred had defendant not been negligent. When the
driver of another car makes a sudden left turn in front of defendant's
car,3 1 or pulls from an obscure private drive 7 or servient road3 into
defendant's path of travel, a collision is made inevitable and defendant's
excessive speed does not increase the risk of its occurrence. In this
situation the foreseeability of the intervening negligence is important to
the determination of the defendant's liability. If he had reason to foresee
the other person's negligence, his conduct has contributed to the risk
"'Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C. 185, 136 S.E.2d 668 (1964).
"'Dolan v. Simpson, 269 N.C. 438, 152 S.E.2d 523 (1967).
'Baker v. Smith, 265 N.C. 598, 144 S.E.2d 658 (1965) (per curiam).
"'Capps v. Smith, 263 N.C. 120, 139 S.E.2d 19 (1964) (per curiam); Loving v. Whitton, 241
N.C. 273, 84 S.E.2d 919 (1954).
"'Hout v. Harvell, 270 N.C. 274, 154 S.E.2d 41 (1967); Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 6
S.E.2d 808 (1940).
"'Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d 111 (1953).
'a'Reeves v. Staley, 220 N.C. 573, 18 S.E.2d 239 (1942).
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and he will be held liable."' Surrounding circumstances may indicate
that the intervening acts could have been anticipated,"' but if they do
not, the specific negligence of the intervenor will be held unforeseeable.
In some circumstances defendant may be liable even though an
accident would have happened without his negligence. If, for example,
in an automobile accident defendant's speed, although it does not in-
crease the risk of the initial collision, causes him to lose control of his
car or causes it to travel away from the scene of the collision so that a
second accident occurs, defendant is held liable for injury caused by the
second impact."' His speed has been a major factor in causing the
second accident.
Finally, unforeseeability of intervening misconduct is the stated
reason for holding the defendant not liable in some cases in which the
real basis for decision seems to be policy.142 These cases probably reflect
a judgment that under the circumstances a wrongdoer other than the
defendant should be held responsible rather than a determination that
the risk causing injury is outside the scope of defendant's conduct. This
conclusion is evident in much of the terminology used by the court.
Defendant is not to be held liable because "the injury. . . was indepen-
dently and proximately produced by the wrongful act. . . of an outside
agency or responsible third person,"'' 4 because the intervening miscon-
duct was the "real, efficient" cause 44 or the "sole proximate cause"'45
of the injury, because the defendant's negligence was "passive,"'' 4 or
'See Streater v. Marks, 267 N.C. 32, 147 S.E.2d 529 (1966); King v. Powell, 252 N.C. 506,
114 S.E.2d 265 (1960); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C. 430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952).
"'See Gregory v. Lynch, 271 N.C. 198, 155 S.E.2d 488 (1967); Marshburn v. Patterson, 241
N.C. 441, 85 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
"'Jones v. Horton, 264 N.C. 549, 142 S.E.2d 351 (1965); Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353,
82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
"'See cases cited notes 158-63 infra.
"'Philyaw v. City of Kinston, 246 N.C. 534, 537, 98 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1957); McLaney v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 236 N.C. 714, 718, 74 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1953); accord, e.g., Potter v.
Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 242 N.C. 67, 70, 86 S.E.2d 780, 782 (1955); Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C.
632, 642, 74 S.E.2d 24, 30 (1953).
"'E.g., Owens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 258 N.C. 92, 95, 128 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1962) (per curiam);
Rowe v. Murphy, 250 N.C. 627, 633, 109 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1959); Clark v. Lambreth, 235 N.C.
578, 585, 70 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1952).
"'Basnight v. Wilson, 245 N.C. 548, 553, 96 S.E.2d 699, 703 (1957); Quinn v. Atlantic & Y.
Ry., 213 N.C. 48, 50, 195 S.E. 85, 87 (1938); accord, e.g., Troxler v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,
240 N.C. 420, 82 S.E.2d 342 (1954).
"'White v. Cason, 251 N.C. 646, 649-50, 111 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1960); Montgomery v. Blades,
222 N.C. 463, 469, 23 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1943).
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because the defendant's negligence "would have resulted in no injury but
for the negligent act of"' the intervenor.
The "but for" rationale set out in the last of the above quotations
seems to be a curious twist of the "but for" inquiry employed to deter-
mine the existence of actual causation. Thus, to say that injury would
not have occurred but for the intervenor's act is not quite the same thing
as saying that the accident would have happened without the defendant's
negligence. In most cases of concurring negligence, it can be said that
one defendant's negligence would not have caused an accident but for
the negligence of the other; and if this is to be the test of liability, neither
defendant will be liable. Many of the cases in which this "but for"
reasoning is used involve factual situations in which defendant's negli-
gence has not increased the risk of injury and the outcome reached by
the court is the proper one.14
At one time the North Carolina Supreme Court held that interven-
ing acts, to relieve the original defendant of liability, had to be gross
and palpable.' Although this test of defendant's liability when another
cause intervenes has been replaced by foreseeability, 0 the extraordinary
nature of the intervening cause may still relieve the defendant of liabil-
ity. Defendant's responsibility has been held not to extend to injury
brought about by the intervenor's intentional' or criminal' conduct,
when the intervenor acted with knowledge of the danger that existed,'
or when his conduct was reckless or grossly negligent.' If existing
"'Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co., 250 N.C. 435, 445, 108 S.E.2d 900, 907 (1959); accord,
e.g., Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958); Mintz v. Town of Murphy, 235 N.C.
304, 69 S.E.2d 849 (1952); Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N.C. 415, 20 S.E.2d 561 (1942).
"'See, e.g., Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co., 250 N.C. 435, 108 S.E.2d 900 (1959); Smith v.
Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598 (1953).
"'See cases cited note 94 supra.
"'See cases cited note 95 supra.
"'Herring v. Humphrey, 254 N.C. 741, 119 S.E.2d 913 (1961) (child's intentional act of
running unlocked bulldozer into house); Lineberry v. North Carolina Ry., 187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E.
1 (1924) (child pushed playmate into speeding train); Fanning v. J.G. White & Co., 148 N.C. 541,
62 S.E. 734 (1908) (stranger fired bullet into shanty in which dynamite negligently stored).
"'Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100 S.E.2d 511 (1957) (negligent operation of car by
thief); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 174 S.E. 443 (1934) (employee injured by coal thrown
from railway car by thieves); Chancey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E. 834 (1917)
(railway passenger robbed in dark, overcrowded car).
'"Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949); Powers
v. S. Sternberg & Co., 213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88 (1938).
"'Faircloth v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E.2d 328 (1957); Jeffries v.
Powell, 221 N.C. 415, 20 S.E.2d 561 (1942); Newell v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374 (1936).
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circumstances indicate that events out of the ordinary may intervene-a
fact sometimes difficult to prove to the court's satisfaction 5 -their
occurrence will not insultate the defendant from liability.156
The classic illustration of the type of case under consideration is
that of the plaintiff who is deliberately pushed into an open excavation
negligently left unguarded by the defendant. The decision that defendant
is not liable may be justified simply by holding that the intervening
intentional act was unforeseeable or by holding that the result was not
within the risks created by defendant's conduct. Defendant risked the
possibility that someone would negligently or inadvertently be pushed
or fall into the excavation; he did not, however,, risk the result that
someone would be intentionally pushed into it.
To quarrel with these seemingly plausible conclusions may appear
to be unreasonable. Yet, this approach to the application of the foresee-
ability concept is troublesome. Injury has resulted from the very risk
that made defendant's conduct negligent-the unguarded excavation. It
is known that there are some people who will recklessly or intentionally
act upon a perilous situation to cause injury to others, and their exist-
ence increases the potential danger of the risk defendant has created. If
no significant risks were otherwise involved in defendant's conduct,
reasonable care would not require him to safeguard against such inter-
vening acts. If, however, his conduct in itself is unreasonable, it is diffi-
cult to see why the intervention of intentional conduct is a basis for
terminating his liability rather than an additional reason to hold him
liable. Further, an analysis that denies defendant's liability because of
unforeseeability of the specific intervening conduct that precipitated the
risk would perhaps be even more objectionable. That view would relieve
the defendant of liability in most cases in which intervening causes of
any kind were involved.
The decisive issue in these cases may not be foreseeability. Further,
the crucial fact in them may not be the intentional or criminal nature
of the intervenor's conduct but instead may be his knowledge of the
existence of the dangerous situation upon which he acts. The decision
""Leake v. Queen City Coach Co., 270 N.C. 669, 155 S.E.2d 161 (1967) (unforesseable that
loud and aggressive drunk on bus will assault passenger); Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530,
174 S.E. 443 (1934) (unforeseeable that employee will be injured by coal thrown from railway car
by thieves whose mission was foreseeable); Chancey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 93 S.E.
834 (1917) (unforeseeable that railway passenger will be robbed in dark crowded car).
'Stanley v. Southern Ry., 160 N.C. 323, 76 S.E. 221 (1912); Penny v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 133 N.C. 221,45 S.E. 563 (1903); Britton v. Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry., 88 N.C. 536 (1882).
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not to impose liability on the defendant is a policy decision to shift
responsibility from the defendant to the intervenor. It is a decision that
when the wrongdoer with knowledge of the danger acts deliberately or
recklessly to bring it about, basic fairness dictates that responsibility for
the accident be placed on him. The North Carolina case that perhaps
comes closest to recognizing this policy as the basis for decision is
Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,157 a case in which the
intervening conduct was not intentional. Defendant sold a defective hot
water heater to plaintiff and because of the defect gas escaped into the
furnace room where the heater was installed. A repairman was called
and warned of the presence of gas in the room. The repairman, after
entering the furnace room, struck a match and the gas exploded. The
court, in holding the seller of the defective heater not liable, emphasized
that the repairman had acted with knowledge of the danger that existed.
Shifting responsibility, although seldom mentioned by the court,
seems to have had a significant influence on the North Carolina deci-
sions. The intervenor's conduct, when characterized as gross, palpable,
or reckless by the court, has been held to insulate the defendant's negli-
gence even when the intervenor had no knowledge of the danger defen-
dant's negligence had created. 5 In some of these cases other circum-
stances, such as a dangerous railroad crossing or a congested highway
should have alerted the intervenor to the need for caution, but he was
unaware of the increased danger created by defendant's negligence."'1 It
is difficult to understand how these cases involve anything more than
concurring negligence. For example, it is not apparent why, in a
railroad-crossing collision, a motorist's speed or failure to keep a proper
lookout is regarded as an intervening cause to the railroad's speed and
failure to warn. And it is not clear why, even as between the wrongdoers,
basic fairness would place responsibility for the accident on the motor-
ist. Both the engineer and the motorist were negligent; the negligence
of each risked the danger of collision; and both were aware of the need
for special caution because of the crossing.
The idea of shifting responsibility may account for another line of
157231 N.C. 270, 56 S.E.2d 689 (1949).
"S1Hudson v. Petroleum Transit Co., 250 N.C. 435, 108 S.E.2d 900 (1959); Faircloth v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E.2d 328 (1957); Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N.C. 415,
20 S.E.2d 561 (1942); Newell v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374 (1936).
"'Faircloth v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E.2d 328 (1957); Jones v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 235 N.C. 640, 70 S.E.2d 669 (1952).
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decisions'60 in which the court has adopted principles, substantially
identical to those involved in last clear chance, to allocate liability
among several defendants whose negligent acts have combined to injure
a third person. Under these principles, when one defendant negligently
creates a dangerous condition upon which the negligence of another
defendant operates to cause injury to the plaintiff, the first defendant is
relieved of liability to the plaintiff if the other defendant discovered or
could have discovered the danger in time to avoid the accident."' For
example, in McLaney v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.6 2 the first defen-
dant negligently parked his truck on the highway and the second defen-
dant, who failed to keep a proper lookout and did not discover the
presence of the truck, collided with it. The court held that the plaintiff,
who was injured in the collision, had no cause of action against the first
defendant.
Both the decisions and the incorporation of the principles of last
clear chance into the question of intervening cause seem wrong. The
problems in the two situations to which the principles are applied bear
little resemblance. Last clear chance applies when the defendant has
been negligent and the plaintiff has been contributorily negligent. Its
purpose is to lessen the harshness of the bar of contributory negligence.
It applies to hold the defendant liable despite the plaintiff's contributory
negligence. In stark contrast, the principles, when applied to intervening
cause, restrict rather than enhance plaintiff's right to recover. Finally,
to release the defendant and to leave the injured plaintiff to take what-
ever chances may be involved in seeking recovery from the intervenor
seems repugnant to any sense of basic fairness.
The rule that liability exists for a foreseeable risk realized in an
unforeseeable way is generally recognized.' Its thrust is that a defen-
dant will be held liable for injury caused by an unreasonable risk of his
conduct even though he could not foresee the way in which the risk
would be activated or the manner in which it would cause harm. As a
risk created by defendant's conduct may materialize in injury in a num-
ber of ways, the fact that the way in which it was precipitated was
"'Clark v. Lambreth, 235 N.C. 578, 70 S.E.2d 828 (1952); Ferguson v. City of Asheville, 213
N.C. 569, 197 S.E. 146 (1938). But see Caulder v. Gresham, 224 N.C. 402, 30 S.E.2d 312 (1944);
Powers v. S. Sternberg & Co., 213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88 (1938).
'Owens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 258 N.C. 92, 128 S.E.2d 4 (1962); Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N.C.
415,20 S.E.2d 561 (1942); Hinnant v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 202 N.C. 489, 163 S.E. 555 (1932).
82 236 N.C. 714, 74 S.E.2d 36 (1953).
"UW. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 44, at 286-89.
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unforeseeable is not considered significant enough to relieve the defen-
dant of liability. If without the unforeseeable intervening cause defen-
dant's conduct involved no unreasonable risks or if because of its inter-
vention the risk causing harm is a different one from or of greater
magnitude than risks threatened by his conduct, defendant will not be
held responsible. However, when the injury is the one risked by defen-
dant's conduct, the result, though brought about by an unforeseeable
intervening cause, is reasonably to be attributed to defendant's fault.
The rule imposing liability for risked harm brought about in an
unforeseeable way has been sparingly applied by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. It has been most consistently used in cases in which an
intervening act of God combines with defendant's negligence to cause
injury.'64 Otherwise,"5 only in an occasional case is liability imposed,'
and when acts of third parties intervene, imposition of liability is espe-
cially unlikely.6 7 The court's reluctance to hold the defendant liable is
demonstrated by its opinion in Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem.'
Defendant's negligent storage of combustibles created a fire hazard that
may have been ignited by a third person or unknown source. In regard
to defendant's liability under these circumstances, the court said:
The law does not charge a person with all the possible conse-
quences of his negligence, nor that which is merely possible. A man's
responsibility for his negligence must end somewhere. If the connec-
tion between negligence and the injury appears unnatural, unreasona-
ble, and improbable in light of common experience, the negligence, if
deemed a cause of the injury at all, is to be considered a remote rather
than a proximate cause. It imposes too heavy a responsibility for
111Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Terminal, Inc., 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d
735 (1968); Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co., 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925); Pickens
County v. Jennings, 181 N.C. 393, 107 S.E. 244 (1921); Harris v. Norfolk S.R.R., 173 N.C. 110,
91 S.E. 691 (1917).
'"Johnson v. Meyer's Co., 246 N.C. 310, 98 S.E.2d 315 (1957) (stranger backed car into
improperly secured sign in parking lot; no liability); Alford v. Washington, 238 N.C. 694,78 S.E.2d
915 (1953) (car collided with pole and caused uninsulated electric wires to fall; no liability); Davis
v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 238 N.C. 106, 76 S.E.2d 378 (1953) (metal tape thrown over
uninsulated power line; no liability); Pugh v. Tidewater Power Co., 237 N.C. 693, 75 S.E.2d 766
(1953) (metal wire on which kite flown came into contact with uninsulated power lines).
'
T Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E.2d 380 (1960) (defective hot water
heater sold by defendant installed by contractor in room without ventilation); Newton v. Texas
Co., 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920) (negligently spilled gasoline ignited by unknown source);
Dillon v. City of Raleigh, 124 N.C. 184, 32 S.E. 548 (1899) (runaway horse ran into post in street).
'"See cases cited in notes 151-6 supra.
1-272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967).
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negligence to hold the tort-feasor responsible for what is unusual and
unlikely to happen or for what was only remotely and slightly proba-
ble.169
Even when a person's own fault has played a part in it, a natural
response is to sympathize with his misfortune when it has occurred in
an unusual or unexpected way. However, this response, when defen-
dant's negligence has caused harm to another person in an unexpected
way, may disguise the issue to be decided. A loss has occurred and either
defendant or the injured person must bear that loss. Defendant's negli-
gence has played a substantial part in causing the loss, and the risk that
brought it about was one of those that made his conduct negligent. The
injured person's role is simply that of the victim. Although fault is
accepted as the test for extent of liability as well as its existence, the
North Carolina decisions that leave the injured person to bear the loss
under these circumstances seem wrong.
SECONDARY RISKS OF NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
Sometimes injury is not caused by one of the risks threatened
directly by the wrongdoer's conduct but by a risk that is incident to the
situation that his negligence has created. The negligent conduct has left
the plaintiff in a position of danger, and he is injured by the danger or
by his or a third person's attempt to extricate him from it. The rescuer
himself may be injured in his effort to aid the plaintiff. In the course of
medical treatment of injuries inflicted by the defendant's negligence,
additional injuries may be incurred either incidental to normal treat-
ment or because of the doctor's malpractice. The plaintiff's weakened
or impaired condition because of the injury from defendant's negligence
may make him susceptible to further injury. In some of these instances
it is easy enough to say that the risk that caused injury was foreseeable;
in others the foreseeability of the intervening cause, when viewed at the
time of defendant's conduct, is debatable.
Whether or not these and similar intervening causes are foreseea-
ble, extension of defendant's responsibility to include them seems appro-
priate. When looked at in the context of the situation defendant's negli-
gence has created, they may be regarded as a normal incident of that
situation or, at the least, as not an abnormal or unusual consequence
of it. Although courts have imposed liability by holding such intervening
1'1d. at 30, 157 S.E.2d at 723.
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causes to be foreseeable, a more sensible and reliable approach may be
to recognize that the determination of extent of liability is not only
affected by what defendant could anticipate before he acted but also by
circumstances his acts have brought into existence.
A result of defendant's negligent conduct may be to place the plain-
tiff in a position in which harm to him is likely to occur. Defendant's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle may knock the plaintiff into the
path of an oncoming vehicle 170 or leave him helpless in the street", where
he is run over by another vehicle. The collision caused by defendant's
negligence may subject the plaintiff's car and its passengers to the haz-
ards of a second collision with another car.' In all of these instances
the risk of further injury is reasonably attributed to the defendant's
fault, and he is held liable for the harm that occurs. Similarly, when
plaintiff, dazed by the first impact, walked into the highway into the
path of an oncoming car, the defendant, whose negligence caused the
first collision, was held liable for injuries incurred when the plaintiff was
struck by the other car.7 3
If defendant's negligence does not increase the risk of injury to the
plaintiff through the second impact, he should not be held liable for its
consequences. Thus in Bats v. Faggart174 liability was not imposed when
after the collision plaintiff had regained his faculties, turned his car
around, and begun to travel in the proper traffic lane when his car was
struck in the rear by another negligently operated vehicle. At the time
of the second collision the increased risk of traffic hazards to which the
original collision exposed the plaintiff had come to an end, and the
danger of an accident was no greater than it would have been had the
first collision not occurred.
The determination whether defendant's negligence has increased
the risk of the second collision may be a difficult one. For example, in
Darrock v. Johnson 75 the defendant in rounding a curve drove his car
across the center line of the highway and collided with plaintiff's car.
Immediately thereafter another car crossed the center line and struck
2 7Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub.-Serv. Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920).
"'Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N.C. 504, 193 S.E. 814 (1937); West v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C.
526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935).
"'Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66
S.E.2d 690 (1951).
'"Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951).
17260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963).
'-250 N.C. 307, 108 S.E.2d 589 (1959).
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plaintiff's car. Personal injuries to the plaintiff resulted from the second
collision only. Unless the first impact has impeded the plaintiff's ability
to take evasive action to avoid the second car, a plausible argument can
be made that it has not increased the risk of the second collision. On
the other hand, it seems so likely that the first collision had a significant
influence upon the driver of the second car who was suddenly confronted
with it that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it should be assumed
that defendant's conduct increased the risk of the second collision. The
court, without analysis of the problem, held the defendant liable.
One other case deserves attention. In Copple v. Warner17 1 the first
collision jammed two vehicles together in the proper lane of travel. After
the drivers had got out of their cars and separated them, another motor-
ist crossed the center line of the highway and collided with the car
defendant had struck and injured a passenger who sat in it. The court,
holding the defendant not liable, emphasized the appreciable time lapse
between the first and second collisions and the fact that the car was left
in the proper lane of travel after the first collision. The importance of
the second fact is apparent. While the presence of a car at a standstill
may enhance the risk of a collision with another car traveling in the
traffic lane in which it is stranded, it does not increase the risk that a
motorist driving in the other lane of travel will, when confronted with
no emergency, drive his car across the center line to cause a collision.
The significance of time lapse between the collisions is less apparent.
Probably its importance is the opportunity it gave the plaintiff to extri-
cate himself from the danger. Once the passenger was aware of the risk
and had reasonable opportunity to avoid it, defendant's responsibility
should come to an end.
In some instances defendant may be held liable for the entire harm
caused by successive impacts although his negligence has not increased
the risk of the second impact. 77 The basis for liability is the practical
impossibility of apportioning damages when the impacts produce an
indivisible injury or separate injuries which cannot be related to any
specific impact. These decisions represent a policy decision that it is
better to hold a wrongdoer for harm he may not have caused than to
deny the innocent plaintiff all recovery.
Defendant is also responsible when a person endangered by his
176260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963).
'"For discussion, see Byrd, supra note 1, at 275-77.
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negligence injures himself' 78 or a third person'79 while attempting to
escape the danger. Neither the fact that defendant was not involved
directly in the accident' 80 nor the fact that injury occurred in a different
way than that risked by his conduct 8' will preclude imposition of liabil-
ity. For example, when defendant's negligence threatens a collision be-
tween his car and another, and the driver of the other car through
evasive action avoids that collision but in doing so is injured in another
accident, defendant is liable."8 ' The risk that causes injury in each case
arises out of the situation created by defendant's negligence, and
whether or not it is regarded as foreseeable, defendant's liability should
clearly include the harm it has caused.
Only a slight extension of these principles is required to hold the
wrongdoer liable to a third party who is injured while attempting to aid
the person endangered by his negligence. Under the "rescue doctrine"
the court has permitted the rescuer to recover not only when a third
person was imperiled'1 but also when the negligent party placed him-
self in a position of peril"8 4 from which the rescuer attempted to extricate
him. The negligence of the person to the aid of whom the rescuer comes
will not relieve the defendant of liability to him,'85 and the rescuer's own
conduct in encountering a known danger, even when risk to his own life
may be involved, to save the life of another will not bar his recovery.' 8'
The same rules have been applied to injury incurred by an individ-
"'Underwood v. Gay, 268 N.C. 715, 151 S.E.2d 590 (1966) (per curiam) (plaintiff, in taking
evasive action to avoid striking defendant's truck ran off road); Bondurant v. Mastin, 252 N.C.
190, 113 S.E.2d 292 (1960) (plaintiff, in taking evasive action, collided with oncoming truck),
"'Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 149 S.E.2d 590 (1966) (injury to passenger in car that
left road to avoid collision with defendant's car); Cotton Co. v. Ford, 239 N.C. 292, 79 S.E.2d
389 (1954) (third person's evasive action caused him to collide with plaintiff's car).
IRSlaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965) (plaintiff, frightened by defen-
dant's conduct, fell while running away); Langford v. Shu, 258 N.C. 135, 128 S.E.2d 210 (1962)
(plaintiff stepped into brick wall when frightened by practical joke); Morgan v. Bell Bakeries, Inc.,
246 N.C. 429, 98 S.E.2d 464 (1957) (truck, in effort to avoid collision with defendant's truck,
jackknifed across road and was struck by oncoming truck).
"'Robertson v. Ghee, 262 N.C. 584, 138 S.E.2d 220 (1964) (per curiam) (defendant's negli-
gence caused wreck in which passenger was thrown onto road; plaintiff, in taking evasive action
to avoid striking passenger, ran off road); Hinton v. Southern Ry., 172 N.C. 587, 90 S.E, 756
(1916) (plaintiff, to avoid collision with train, ran car into building).
"'See cases cited notes 178-81 supra.
"'Bumgarner v. Southern Ry., 247 N.C. 374, 100 S.E.2d 830 (1957); Norris v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 152 N.C. 505, 67 S.E. 1017 (1910).
'"Britt v. Mangum, 261 N.C. 250, 134 S.E.2d 235 (1964).
"'Norris v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 152 N.C. 505, 67 S.E. 1017 (1910).
"'See cases cited note 183 supra.
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ual in an effort to save his own property17 or that of others"'8 from
danger created by defendant's negligence. However, the cases "make
some distinction between risks allowable when human life is at stake
and those when the destruction of property is presently threatened,"'8 "
and the estate of an employee who, after reaching a position of safety,
recklessly returned to a burning building to save his employer's property
has no action for his death against the person who negligently set the
fire. 10 But recognition is given to the fact "that it is both the right and
the duty of an owner to make every reasonable endeavor to save his
property from destruction and that in passing upon his conduct full
allowance shall be made for the natural impulse prompting the effort
and for the emergency under which he acts."''
9
Essentially the same approach is used when plaintiff is injured in
an attempt to avert impending danger threatened by defendant's con-
duct to the person or property of others. The risk to the person who
attempts to remedy the situation is held to come within the scope of
defendant's responsibility, and his recovery will not be barred by contri-
butory negligence solely on the basis of the fact that he has acted in the
face of known danger. 92
Under the general principle that holds a defendant responsible for
those risks that are not an abnormal or unusual incident of the situation
in which his negligence has placed the plaintiff, a wrongdoer has been
held liable for additional injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the course
of normal medical treatment of the original injuries caused by his negli-
gence."I Further, in most jurisdictions the defendant is held responsible
for the malpractice of a physician carefully chosen by the plaintiff,
unless the physician's negligence is highly unusual.'94 A number of
North Carolina decisions 95 are consistent with this view, but uncertainty
'nMcKay v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 160 N.C. 260, 75 S.E. 1081 (1912); Burnett v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 132 N.C. 261, 43 S.E. 797 (1903).
"'Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 123 S.E.2d 785 (1962) (by implication).
"'McKay v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 160 N.C. 260, 262, 75 S.E. 1081, 1082 (1912).
"
0Pegram v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 139 N.C. 303, 51 S.E. 975 (1905).
"'McKay v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 160 N.C. 260, 262, 75 S.E. 1081, 1082 (1912).
"'Moore v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 263 N.C. 601, 139 S.E.2d 879 (1965); Rodgers v. Thompson,
256 N.C. 265, 123 S.E.2d 785 (1962).
"'Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926); Sears v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 169 N.C. 446, 86 S.E. 176 (1915).
'W. PRossER, supra note 60, § 44, at 278-79.
"'See, e.g., Bell v. Hankins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958); Smith v. Thompson, 210
N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936).
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about the rule that will be applied has arisen out of a later case.' 8
In the earlier decisions the issue before the court was whether a
release of the original tortfeasor by the injured person operated to dis-
charge the negligent physician from liability to him. The court, holding
that the physician was discharged by the release, recognized and ap-
proved the general rule that a tortfeasor is liable for aggravation of
injuries caused by a physician's malpractice. The holding in these cases
was overruled by a statute'97 which states that suit against the physician
is not barred by release of the original tortfeasor unless its terms ex-
pressly provide for his discharge. In Galloway v. Lawrence98 the statute
was applied to uphold an action against a physician by an injured person
who had earlier executed a release to the original tortfeasor. The court
drew a comparison between the present case and a wrongful death case
decided before enactment of the statute and noted in effect that death
was an indivisible injury for which payment by the original tortfeasor
would constitute a complete satisfaction. The court then observed: "The
distinction is this: plaintiffs here seek to recover for a second, indepen-
dent, subsequent injury following that which was inflicted by [the origi-
nal defendant]. These actions are based upon a later and separate
tort."' 9'
It is difficult to quarrel with the quoted statement, but it is equally
difficult to understand what significance the court intended it to have.
Perhaps the court was only distinguishing personal injury and wrongful
death, as did a later decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals
in holding the statute inapplicable to a wrongful death case."' Its pur-
pose may have been simply to recognize that one possible objective
intended by the legislature-to permit the plaintiff to settle with the
original defendant for injuries he caused and then to sue the physician
for injuries caused by the malpractice-is at least theoretically feasible.
This view, in light of the statute, would not be inconsistent with the rule
that the original tortfeasor is liable for the physician's subsequent mal-
practice. On the other hand, the court may have intended to suggest that
the malpractice is a separate tort for which the physician alone is lia-
"'Galloway v. Lawrence, 263 N.C. 433, 139 S.E.2d 761 (1965).
'"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.1 (1969).
'1263 N.C. 433, 139 S.E.2d 761 (1964).
'id. at 435, 139 S.E.2d at 763.
IOSimmons v. Wilder, 6 N.C. App. 179, 169 S.E.2d 480 (1969).
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ble. °' If so, the dictum clearly conflicts with the rule recognized in
earlier decisions. The fact that the court, by dictum in a case decided
after Galloway, recognized the rule that the tortfeasor is liable for the
physician's malpractice might indicate that this last interpretation was
not intended. 22
Three other decisions create additional confusion in this area. In
two 2 3 the court seems to hold that when the physician who treats the
plaintiff is selected by the defendant, the defendant will be liable for
injuries caused by the physician's malpractice only if he was negligent
in his selection of the physician. The other case214 contained at least
dictum to the effect that the original tortfeasor, after paying for the
entire injury, has no right to contribution or indemnification against the
physician. Both cases seem inconsistent with the rule that the defendant
is liable for the physician's malpractice; however, in the latter case the
court appears to accept it for purposes of determining the original tort-
feasor's liability.
The principle that a wrongdoer is responsible for risks that are a
normal incident of the situation his negligence has created may apply
to a variety of other circumstances. He has been held liable for a second
injury that the original injury has contributed to.20 5 Liability has also
been imposed for damage caused by a backfire started in an effort to
control a fire set by defendant's negligence .2  Also, unsuccessful efforts
of others to bring under control a risk of the situation created by defen-
dant's conduct have been held not to terminate his liability. 27
SOME OBSERVATIONS
Everyone has had something to say about causation, and an enor-
'For a discussion of practical difficulties that would arise if this position were taken, see Byrd
& Dobbs, supra note 81, at 931-32.
2
'Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545, 548-49, 148 S.E.2d 548, 552 (1966).
'Gosnell v. Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 234, 162 S.E. 569 (1932); McMahan v. Carolina Spruce
Co., 180 N.C. 636, 105 S.E. 439 (1920).
O'Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941).
"'Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964).
1oBalcum v. Johnson, 177 N.C. 213, 98 S.E. 532 (1919).
"
0THardy v. Hines Bros. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 113, 75 S.E. 855 (1912) (unsuccessful effort
to extinguish fire); Harton v. Forest City Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299 (1906) (fallen
telephone pole, propped up by passerby, later fell). But see Baker v. City of Lumberton, 239 N.C.
401, 79 S.E.2d 886 (1935) (fallen, uninsulated electric wires supposedly "dead" until moved by
homeowner; no liability); Doggett v. Richmond & D.R.R., 78 N.C. 305 (1878) (fire apparently
extinguished by third parties later rekindled; no liability).
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mous volume of literature on the subject exists. Some writers have
attempted to structure definite rules that could be applied with certainty
to the solution of the problem of the extent of legal responsibility." 8
Others have rejected these attempts and urged that the question of legal
responsibility is one that can be decided only on an ad hoc case-by-case
basis.2 19 While only a few years ago causation was the burning issue that
attracted the thoughts and energies of tort scholars, their attention is
now focused on the concept of duty, and proximate cause has fallen
somewhat into disfavor. However, the task of determining the extent of
a tortfeasor's responsibility for harm his negligence has caused, whether
dealt with under proximate cause or some other legal concept, is likely
to confront courts as long as the fault system remains in effect.
The foreseeability rule which has been adopted by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court is perhaps the best broad general principle that can
be devised for determination of legal responsibility. Its usefulness can
be fostered, however, by the frank recognition that other factors do
influence the decision whether a wrongdoer is to be held liable for
consequences his negligence has caused. Further, the inquiry whether a
result or event is foreseeable, unless stated with care, may place an
undue emphasis upon the details of what has happened and in this way
prejudge to some extent the determination to be made. Even the broader
inquiry of the fairness of holding defendant liable for particular conse-
quences may tend to focus too much upon the wrongdoer's plight and
to ignore the crucial fact that a loss has occurred that will fall upon the
injured person if the defendant is relieved of liability.
In the area of intervening cause, although foreseeability is stated
to be the test of liability, the idea of shifting responsibility seems to have
played a major role in the court's decisions. Although the policy incor-
porated into this concept may legitimately affect the determination of
liability, its extensive use by the North Carolina Supreme Court is
difficult to justify. In some cases in which it is the apparent basis for
decision it is not easy to see why, even when only the interest of the
wrongdoers are taken into account, one of them should be held liable
any more than the other. More importantly, except in unusual cases as
when the intervenor deliberately brings about injury, there is no good
mE.g., Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1920); Carpen-
ter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 396, 471 (1932);
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 149 (1925).
20E.g., Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957).
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reason to regard the relative fault of the wrongdoers as a factor that
should limit the injured person's right to recover against them. A defi-
nite tendency to focus upon the foreseeability of a particular intervening
act is evident in the North Carolina decisions. This tendency may ex-
plain the relatively infrequent use by the court of the well-established
rule that holds a tortfeasor liable for harm from foreseeable risks of his
conduct that materialize in an unforeseeable way.
Understanding of the North Carolina decisions on causation may
require recognition of the fact that in many of the cases decided on the
basis of proximate cause principles the decisive issue was probably one
of negligence or duty. The same caution is necessary in other instances
as well. For example, when the facts show that a defendant's negligence
has not increased the risk of the injury incurred, it will frequently con-
clude that the intervening cause that contributed to produce the accident
was unforeseeable. Finally, many rules announced by the court, such as
the "but for" and "intervention of an outside agency or responsible third
party" rationales, probably should not be regarded as useful analytical
tools despite the court's frequent reference to them.
One final observation should be made. Whatever else the court may
or may not have done, it has achieved a surprising consistency in the
outcome of the cases it has decided.
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